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Greece & the Odious Debt Doctrine 
INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign debt and subsequent repayment problems are 
not recent phenomena. In fact, the first sovereign default may 
date as far back as “the fourth century B.C., when ten out of 
thirteen Greek municipalities . . . defaulted on [their] loans 
from the Delos Temple.”1 Sovereign default is not only an 
ancient occurrence, but it is also a historically pervasive and 
enduring one. While the sixteenth century observed a 
particular prevalence of sovereign debt restructurings and 
defaults,2 the nineteenth century witnessed a significantly 
widespread and recurrent eruption of national debt crises.3 
Indeed, given the longevity and frequency of sovereign debt 
problems, it may be curious that our modern world still 
struggles to resolve these issues as much as it does. 
When confronted with the problem of struggling 
sovereign debtors, perhaps one of the creditor’s most 
challenging tasks is to determine where to demand one’s dues 
and where to acquiesce. An annual report of the U.N. 
Commission for International Law reflects on this issue:  
A state cannot . . . be expected to close its schools and universities and 
its courts, to disband its police force and to neglect its public services 
to such an extent as to expose its community to chaos and anarchy 
merely to provide the money wherewith to meet its moneylenders, 
foreign or national. There are limits to what may be reasonably 
expected of a State in the same manner as with an individual.4  
  
 1 FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND 
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 3 (2006) (citing MAX WINKLER, FOREIGN BONDS, 
AN AUTOPSY: A STUDY OF DEFAULTS AND REPUDIATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS 
22 (1933)).  
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Special Rapportuer on State Responsibility, Addendum—Eighth Report on 
State Responsibility; The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of 
International Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 
(Feb. 29, 1980; June 10, 19, 1980) (by Robert Ago), reprinted in [1980] Y.B. Int’l 
Comm’n, 23-24, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/333 (Part 1) (citations omitted), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_315.pdf (comment from South 
African Government). 
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This touches upon a key issue: at the point when a 
creditor is dealing with a financially unstable sovereign debtor, 
the creditor must re-examine the reasonableness of its 
expectations of repayment and adjust accordingly. 
Today, over two millennia after its Delos Temple event 
marked sovereign default history, the state of Greece steps 
back into the debt spotlight. The Greek debt crisis began to 
attract notice in late 2009, and by 2012, Greece had experienced a 
widening of bond yield spreads,5 downgrading of their bond 
rating,6 and two bailout loans from the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) and the Eurozone countries,7 conditional on harsh 
austerity measures.8 Before the last bailout loan took place, great 
concern existed that Greece would lose its already unstable 
economic footing and plunge into default by mid-March 2012.9 
One theoretical solution to resolve Greek’s debt crisis is 
the doctrine of odious debt, which has attracted significant 
attention from the internet and other media outlets.10 While the 
  
 5 GEORGIOS P. KOURETAS, THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS: ORIGINS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 2 (2012), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/cenfis/eventscf/ 
11sov_debt_Kouretas.pdf; see also Dave Kansas, Greek Bond Yield Spreads Widen, 
Restructuring Chatter Grows, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
marketbeat/2011/04/27/greek-bond-yield-spreads-widen-restructuring-chatter-grows/. 
 6 Deepa Babington & Harry Papachristou, Fitch Downgrades Greece on Debt 
Swap Plan, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/greece-
fitch-idINDEE81L0CP20120222. 
 7 The “Eurozone” refers to the collective body of European Union countries which 
have adopted the euro as their currency. As of June 2013, the Eurozone consisted 17 
member states. See generally EUROZONE PORTAL, www.eurozone.europa.eu. 
 8 See Katie Allen et al., Eurozone Debt Crisis: Greek Timeline, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/31/eurozone-debt-crisis-
greece-crisis-timeline; see also Lesley Wroughton, UPDATE 2-IMF Approves New Greek 
Bailout, Warns on Missteps, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/03/15/imf-greece-idUSL2E8EF5DV20120315. 
 9 Greece was scheduled to tender a bond payment on March 20, 2012, and 
prior to the second rescue package, there existed doubt that Greece would be able to 
honor this payment. See Adam Ewing & Marcus Bensasson, Greece Is Insolvent, Will 
Default on Debt: Fitch, BLOOMBERG (Jan 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-01-17/greece-is-insolvent-will-default-on-its-debt-fitch-says.html. For example, 
Fitch Ratings, who had downgraded Greece’s credit ratings “to CCC, seven levels below 
investment grade,” was among these skeptics. Id. “The so-called private sector 
involvement, for us, would count as a default, it clearly is a default in our book,” Fitch 
Ratings Managing Director Edward Parker reported, “[s]o it won’t be a surprise when 
the Greek default actually happens and we expect it one way or the other to be 
relatively soon.” Id. 
 10 For example, proponents of cancelling Greece’s debt have created Facebook 
pages to the cause. See Cancel Illegitimate and Odious Debt: The Case for Greece, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Cancel-Illegitimate-and-Odious-Debt-the-
Case-for-Greece/102260499854294 (last visited June 29, 2013); see also Greece Debt 
Free, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GreeceDebtFree (last visited June 29, 
2013). An additional example is the book published by Jason Manolopoulos, advocating 
for Greece’s adoption of the odious debt doctrine. See generally JASON MANOLOPOULOS, 
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odious debt doctrine has not yet formally entered the systems 
of international law,11 it finds its momentum through its 
practical and moral principles.12 The doctrine of odious debt is 
based on the concept that “the debt [that] despots incur should 
not form a continuing obligation for states emerging from the 
grips of a despotic government, at least to the extent that the 
debt did not benefit the population that existed under the prior 
regime.”13 The generally accepted definition of “odious debt” is 
debt which was incurred without the consent of the people, 
which did not benefit the people, and which the creditors knew 
was odious.14 Accordingly, under the doctrine, if a debt is shown 
to be odious, it may be cancelled altogether.15 This note seeks to 
analyze the odious debt doctrine within the context of Greece’s 
debt crisis: that is, whether the odious debt doctrine should be 
applied at all, and if it should be, whether Greece’s debt falls 
within the doctrine’s meaning of “odious.” 
This analysis concludes that Greece should not be 
released of its repayment obligations under the odious debt 
theory, based on three primary findings: (1) at a universal 
  
GREECE’S “ODIOUS” DEBT (2011). Also, the results generated by a Google search of 
Greece and odious debt demonstrate the plethora of news commentaries, periodicals, 
private blogs, and public forums that exist to debate the issue. 
 11 See Bradley N. Lewis, Restructuring The Odious Debt Exception, 25 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 297, 298 (2007); see also Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public 
International Law 6-7, 9 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Discussion Paper No. 185, 2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/ 
osgdp20074_en.pdf. The only international convention that addresses debt repayment 
is the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, 
Archives and Debts, which contemplated but ultimately rejected a proposal to 
incorporate “odious debt” into the Convention’s definition of “State debt.” See id. at 9; 
see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-third 
Session, 36 GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A/36/10 (1981) reprinted in [1981] Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n, 78-80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part 2). The International 
Law Commission rejected the proposal on the basis that “the definition of State debt 
should be limited to financial obligations arising at the international level, that is to 
say, between subjects of international law” and, in contrast, the “[d]ebts owed by a 
State to private creditors . . . fell outside the scope of the present draft.” Id at 79-80. 
The International Law Commission concluded instead that it “was of the 
opinion . . . that the rules formulated for each type of succession of States might well 
settle the issues raised.” Id. at 79. 
 12 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 298. 
 13 Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the 
Externalities of A Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 109-10 (2008). 
 14 See Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1201, 1218 (2007); see also Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 605, 606 (2007) (citing Jeff King, The Odious Debt Doctrine in 
International Law: Definition and Evidence, in Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan 
Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 13-52 (CISDL Working Paper No. 
COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available at http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf). 
 15 See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1218. 
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level, the odious debt doctrine should not be applied because of 
its critical inherent doctrinal and administrative failings; (2) 
even if the odious debt doctrine were applied, the serious policy 
risks that accompany its use mandate a narrow interpretation 
of the doctrine, so as to limit its reach to only exceptional cases; 
and (3) under a narrow interpretation of the odious debt 
doctrine, Greece would not be eligible to cancel its debt. 
Parts I through III of this note will present the 
background information necessary for analyzing Greece’s 
sovereign debt. Part I will examine some of the problematic 
characteristics of sovereign debt generally, which set the 
sovereign apart from other debtors. Part II will lay out a timeline 
of Greece’s debt history. Part III will introduce the doctrine of 
odious debts by presenting the doctrine’s elements, underlying 
principles, and history of use. 
Parts IV, V, and VI will analyze the substance of the 
odious debt doctrine and its application to Greece’s situation 
specifically. Part IV will first introduce the fundamental 
problems of the odious debt doctrine—its doctrinal deficiencies 
and administrative shortcomings—showing how the doctrine 
fails as a workable rule. These findings counsel against the use 
of the doctrine altogether. Part V will break down the doctrine 
into two categories—“odious debt” and “odious regime”—and will 
explain how those terms produce liberal and narrow applications 
of the doctrine. This Part will proceed to introduce the serious 
policy problems that a liberal approach implicates, and will 
conclude that therefore only the narrow interpretation is 
warranted. Lastly, Part VI will place this analysis within the 
context of Greece specifically. First, this Part will apply the 
narrow and liberal interpretations of the odious debt doctrine to 
Greece’s situation, ultimately finding that Greece would not be 
eligible under the narrow interpretation and accordingly should 
not repudiate its debts. Finally, in offering some alternatives to 
the odious debt doctrine, this Part will recommend some other 
solutions for Greece to resolve its debt crisis. 
I.  THE CONUNDRUM OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBTOR 
As one commentator points out: “[S]overeign debt is a 
very different ‘animal’ from normal debt.”16 IBISWorld, a 
  
 16 “Kleingut,” Lessons to be Learned from the Greek Past, BLOGSPOT (Jan. 24, 
2012, 1:41 PM), http://klauskastner.blogspot.com/2012/01/lessons-to-be-learned-from-greek- 
past.html. 
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market research organization, opined that “there is no clear-cut 
solution to the problem” of the sovereign debt crisis.17 What is 
the nature of sovereign debt such that it obscures clear-cut 
solutions from view and sets the sovereign apart from other 
debtors? This Part will investigate that question. 
A. Enforcement Problems 
One aspect of sovereign debt that makes the sovereign 
unique among debtors is the lack of an enforcement scheme for 
compelling a sovereign to repay. The following analysis will 
investigate two particular phenomena that restrict a creditor’s 
ability to enforce repayment of a sovereign loan: namely, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the sovereign’s lack of 
seizeable assets. 
First, the concept of “sovereign immunity” is a 
significant obstacle to compelling a sovereign to repay, because 
this doctrine essentially provides the state with a shield to ward 
off creditors from obtaining an enforceable judgment. Sovereign 
immunity is an “undisputed principle of customary international 
law,”18 which generally immunizes a sovereign state from the 
jurisdiction of a foreign state’s courts.19 Since sovereign immunity 
generally protects the sovereign from both criminal and civil 
liability,20 this doctrine presents a significant obstacle for creditors 
seeking satisfaction of their debts through judicial intervention. 
Despite widespread recognition of the principle of 
sovereign immunity, no general consensus has been reached as 
to how it should be applied in international law,21 and there is 
  
 17 TOON VAN BEECK, BE AWARE AND PREPARED: A SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IS 
NEAR 3 (June 2010), available at http://www.ibisworld.com/Common/MediaCenter/ 
Special%20Report%20June%20Sovereign%20Debt.pdf. 
 18 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, [Ch. 5, introductory note] (1986); see also TOM MCNAMARA, A PRIMER ON 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1 (2006), available at http://www.dgslaw.com/documents/ 
articles/McNamara1.pdf. 
 19 See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (finding that 
“[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and 
absolute” and “is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself”). 
 20 Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. 
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 214. But many 
states have enacted restrictive versions of the sovereign immunity laws that limit the 
protection of criminal liability when the transgression involved a violation of human 
rights. For a more extensive discussion, see Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law 
of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2687-2703 (2011). 
 21 See Stephens, supra note 20, at 2691 (finding that “[t]he limited domestic 
and international codification [of sovereign immunity] exacerbates the lack of clarity as 
to the rules governing sovereign immunity,” and that any existing domestic 
codifications vary between an “absolute” form and a “restrictive doctrine,” the latter of 
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moreover very limited domestic codification of the rules 
governing this doctrine.22 While two international treaties have 
been drafted on the subject, neither has received enough 
signatures to be enacted and enforced.23 As a result, sovereign 
immunity principles are generally governed by “uncodified 
domestic rules, often focused on domestic interpretations of 
customary international law, as filtered through each [nation’s] 
constitutional and judicial doctrines.”24 Thus, while the principle 
of sovereign immunity in itself presents an imposing obstacle in a 
creditor’s way, the additional lack of uniformity among sovereign 
immunity codes further complicates repayment enforcement. 
Although sovereign immunity creates a formidable 
hurdle for sovereign debt enforcement, other obstacles to 
collection exist that also serve to distinguish sovereigns from 
other debtors. For example, the recourse of seizing the debtor’s 
assets is much more difficult and complicated with sovereign 
debtors. To illustrate this concept, consider the seizure of a 
corporate debtor’s assets. If a corporation fails to repay its debt, 
unpaid creditors can seek satisfaction by dismantling the 
business entirely and using the proceeds to pay back the 
debts.25 The result is similar in the context of an individual 
debtor, where a creditor can pursue repayment by acquiring a 
court order commanding the individual debtor to pay or 
permitting a seizure of the debtor’s assets to satisfy the debt. 
But no parallel repayment scheme exists in the case of the 
sovereign debtor. While a corporation may be dissolved to satisfy 
debts, “no creditor has the ability to dismantle or liquidate a 
  
which “has led to an ‘extraordinary complexity and variety in the emerging rules,’ with 
consensus ‘only at a rather high level of abstraction’”). 
 22 See id. (finding that “[v]ery few states even have domestic statutes 
governing foreign sovereign immunity”). 
 23 One of these treaties, The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property, will come into force when thirty states have 
ratified it. See The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property, U.N. Doc A/59/38, Art. 30 Dec. 2, 2004; Stephens, supra note 20, at 
2692 n.143. As of June 2013, only fourteen states had become parties to the treaty 
(Austria, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal, 
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). For the status of 
ratifications, see U.N. Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secretary-General, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited 
June 29, 2013). The other treaty, The European Convention on State Immunity, has been 
ratified by only eight states as of June 2013. For the status of its ratifications. See The 
European Convention on State Immunity, E.T.S. 074, 11 I.L.M. 470, May 16, 1972, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG 
(last visited June 29, 2013). 
 24 Stephens, supra note 20, at 2692. 
 25 See Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or 
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2004). 
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country.”26 And unlike the seizure of an individual debtor’s 
assets, the seizure of a sovereign’s assets would involve an 
extremely political and complex—if not impossible—process. 
B. Successive Debt & Non-Financial Priorities: An Unusual 
Combination 
In addition to the enforcement problems associated with 
sovereign debt, another unique disadvantage for creditors is 
that sovereign debt features an unusual and problematic 
combination of individual and corporate debt characteristics. That 
is, on one hand, the sovereign debtor’s priorities with respect to 
repayment resemble an individual debtor’s, while the successive 
nature of sovereign debt reflects corporate debt. In order to 
demonstrate how this combination puts creditors at an unusual 
disadvantage, each of these features will be explained in turn. 
In terms of the sovereign debtor’s priorities when it 
comes to repayment, sovereign debt is more analogous to 
individual debt than to corporate debt.27 Understanding this 
concept requires a look at corporate and individual debtors 
specifically. On one hand, a corporation is essentially an 
“investment vehicle” for its shareholders, meaning that the 
decisions for the life of the corporation are based entirely on the 
goal of obtaining investor returns.28 For this reason, when faced 
with corporate bankruptcy, a corporate debtor would rather 
repay its debt by liquidating assets than face default.29 An 
individual debtor, on the other hand, would likely prioritize her 
quality of life and would rather opt for an “opportunistic 
default” than give up certain benefits, such as decent shelter, a 
cell-phone plan, or clothing for her children.30 Similarly, a 
sovereign state does not view its debt options through the lens of 
obtaining profits and investment returns like a corporation, but 
instead considers political, social, and economic consequences.31 
Like the individual debtor, the sovereign debtor will also likely 
choose an “opportunistic default” before turning to drastic 
  
 26 Id. at 1487. 
 27 Adam Brenneman, Comment, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, Personal 
Bankruptcy, and a Comprehensive Contractual Solution, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006). 
 28 See id. at 658 & n.36 (citing Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of 
the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1163 (2004) 
(“describing corporations as investment vehicles in a discussion that distinguished 
sovereigns and corporations”)). 
 29 Id. at 657-59. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 658-59. 
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measures to finance repayment such as cutting social programs 
or depleting environmental and cultural resources.32 
In another respect, however, the sovereign debtor is 
most analogous to the corporate debtor, since both sovereign 
and corporate debt do not have the option of debt cancellation 
after an average adult life as individual debt does. In other 
words, Uncle Rob’s gambling debts extinguish at his death and 
do not pass on to his successors. In contrast, corporate debts are 
“adhesive” in that the corporation’s debts continue indefinitely 
until repayment, regardless how many times the board of 
directors changes management, the corporation changes 
shareholders, or the corporation is sold to another entity.33 
Similarly, no matter how many times power changes hands or the 
government changes forms, a sovereign’s debt also persists.34 
Thus, sovereign debt is also remarkably adhesive and, in this 
way, more closely resembles corporate than individual debt.  
This adhesiveness allows the sovereign debt to 
perpetually linger—even as the sovereign continues to borrow 
from other creditors—which poses some risks to the creditor. 
For example, the state of Kenya still owes debts that date back 
as far back as 1971 and which are not scheduled for full 
repayment until 2052.35 The longevity of these debts span 
almost double the adult period of a human life;36 thus, were the 
state of Kenya an individual debtor, the loans may have been 
cancelled twice over in that timeframe. Moreover, sovereign 
debtors may likely continue to accrue additional creditors by 
increasing their borrowing in order to meet public needs and 
existing obligations.37 A creditor of sovereign debt, therefore, 
potentially faces increased competition for repayment, since 
  
 32 Id. 
 33 Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1207. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Alphonce Shiundu, Kenya: Red Flag Raised Over Debts From Anglo-
Leasing, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 1, 2011), allafrica.com/stories/201108020085.html. 
 36 For the purposes of this note, the “adult period of a human life” calculates 
to approximately 48-52 years. This is from the viewpoint that one’s adult life begins 
around 20 years old (that is, when an individual is likely adult enough to contract a 
debt), and ends around 68-72 years old, which is the global life expectancy according to 
a 2011 study. See Tom Miles, Global Life Expectancy: Life Spans Continue To Lengthen 
Around The World, WHO Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013) 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/15/global-life-expectancy-span-
world_n_3281211.html. 
 37 For example, since 2009, five countries in the Eurozone—Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus—have had to borrow money from other European 
countries and the IMF in order to avoid defaulting on their existing debts. See 
Associated Press, Eurozone’s 5 bailout packages at a glance, FINANCIAL POST (Mar. 25, 
2013), http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/25/cyprus-bailout-eurozone-rescue/. 
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not only will the sovereign debtor be simultaneously repaying 
all loans, longevity thereof notwithstanding, but additional 
creditors may likely continue to accrue.  
Thus, a creditor faces unusual risk by lending to a 
sovereign because repayment is threatened by the dual hazard of 
(1) the sovereign’s increased disincentive to repay the debt because 
of the state’s non-financial (e.g. social, cultural, environmental) 
priorities, a risk also not present with corporate borrowers, and (2) 
increased competition by other creditors because of the successive 
nature of the sovereign’s debt, a risk that does not exist with 
individual borrowers. These challenges present an unusual 
conundrum for concerned creditors and struggling sovereign 
debtors as they seek solutions to debt repayment. 
The doctrine of odious debt aims to tackle the problem of 
sovereign debt repayment, at least in part, by providing the 
state with an “easy way out” when the debts are “odious.” 
II. A TIMELINE OF GREECE’S DEBT 
A sovereign debtor who has recently stepped into a 
media spotlight is the state of Greece. Before this note can 
consider Greece’s economic situation through the lens of the 
odious debt doctrine, an understanding of Greece’s debt crisis, 
especially the source and nature of Greece’s debt itself, is 
required. This Part will begin by presenting a timeline of 
Greece’s financial history, which introduces the origins and 
application of Greece’s debts. These facts are especially 
important because they inform key elements of the odious debt 
doctrine. This Part will then recount Greece’s interaction with 
the European Union (the “EU”) on issues concerning Greece’s 
deficit—namely, Greece’s initial efforts to conceal the deficit 
from the European Union before ultimately revealing it—and 
then will conclude by describing the international and domestic 
reactions to Greece’s attempts to resolve its debt crisis.  
A. When and How Greece Used Its Debt: 1970–2009 
Increased public debt has been a “feature of the Greek 
economy” since the late 1970s. At that time, public debt was 
only 25 percent of Greece’s gross domestic product (“GDP”), and 
the government borrowed externally only for purposes of 
investment.38 This changed in 1981, however, when a socialist 
  
 38 See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 4. 
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government came into power.39 At that point, Greece began 
spending “to boost consumption in an effort to raise the living 
standard of Greeks.”40 During the same time, however, Greece 
was experiencing a period of stagflation caused by the 1979 oil 
shock,41 which persisted from 1981-1983.42 Because of the 
government’s public spending during a period of stagnant 
economic growth, the Greece government resorted to heavy 
borrowing through the early to mid-1980s to stop the resulting 
rising deficits in the public sector.43 Starting at 25% in 1980, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 80% by the end of that decade.44 
“This upward trend continued” until it reached 110% during 
1993, but then experienced a short plateau due to the Treaty of 
Maastricht’s influence.45  
By 1994, the Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty 
of Maastricht on European Union) had been in effect for two 
years, which called for the establishment of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU).46 Under this treaty, the EU allowed 
only those states whose total sovereign debt fell below 60% of 
GDP to join the Eurozone, among other requirements.47 In an 
effort to qualify, the newly-elected socialist government in 
Greece effected a stabilization program in 1994 to stop the rise 
of Greece’s debt, resulting in a “steady public debt-to-GDP ratio 
at 110%” over the following five years.48 In 2001, although 
Greece still did not meet the qualifying standards, Greece 
  
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See George Alogoskoufis, Greece’s Sovereign Debt Crisis: Retrospect and 
Prospect, 16 (Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, Hellenic Observatory Papers 
on Greece and Southeast Europe No.54, 2012), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/Gre
eSE-No54.pdf. 
 42 See id. at 12. 
 43 Greece—Overview of economy, ENCYCLOPEDIA NATIONS (last visited Apr. 
17, 2013), http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Greece-OVERVIEW-
OF-ECONOMY.html. 
 44 See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 4. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Joshua M. Wepman, Article 104(c) of the Maastricht Treaty and 
European Monetary Union: Does Ireland Hold the Key to Success?, 19 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 247, 247 (1996). 
 47 See id. at 251-52 & n.38, see also Treaty on European Union, 35 O.J.E.C. 
92/c 224/01, 224/35 & 24/120 (Aug. 31, 1992), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1992:224:FULL:EN:PDF (stating 
that “Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits” by not exceeding a 
“reference value,” subject to some exceptions, and providing “reference values” to be 
“3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product 
at market prices;” and “60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product 
at market prices”). 
 48 See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 4. 
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managed to join the Eurozone nonetheless by deceitfully 
submitting incorrect statistics.49 
Generally, adoption of the euro proved to be particularly 
beneficial to the interest rates of countries like Greece, who 
hitherto had experienced “high levels of inflation and a lack of 
economic policy credibility.”50 The ability to borrow in euros 
produced substantially lower interest rates. For example, 
during the 1990s, Greece faced interest rates between 10% to 
18%, but after Greece’s entrance to the Eurozone, interest rate 
fell dramatically to 2%–3%.51 Taking advantage of these 
significantly lower interest rates, the Greek government 
started borrowing heavily in the years following its admission 
to the Eurozone while at the same time increasing government 
spending.52 Between 2001 and 2009, the Greece government 
“ran fiscal deficits of 6% of GDP on . . . average,”53 while its 
debt-to-GDP ratio remained around 100%, which was 
abnormally high for a Eurozone member.54 Among other 
increases to social programs, the Greek government used these 
funds to almost double public sector workers’ wages.55 
Considering that Greece’s public sector accounts for about 40% 
of GDP and that wages in Greece’s public sector are on average 
almost one and half times higher than in the private sector, these 
wage increases reflected substantial government spending.56 Also, 
Greece provided the public with a pension equating to 92% of 
their pre-retirement salary, “one of the most generous pension 
systems in the world.”57 Additionally, Greece was spending a 
substantial percentage of its GDP on its military.58 
The 2004 Athens Olympic Games also accounted for 
significant government spending. In preparation for this world 
  
 49 See Allen et al., supra note 8. 
 50 See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 2. 
 51 See Harry Wallop, Greece: Why Did Its Economy Fall So Hard?, 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/ 
7646320/Greece-why-did-its-economy-fall-so-hard.html. 
 52 See Q&A: Greece’s Economic Woes, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8508136.stm. 
 53 See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 3. 
 54 See Alogoskoufis, supra note 41, at 11. 
 55 See Wallop, supra note 51; Kent Osband, Greece’s Toxic Cure, EUR. FIN. 
REV. (Apr 17, 2012), http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=5014.  
 56 See CIA, Greece, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2012); Greece Program, IMF Board 
Approves 28 Billion Loan for Greece, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/CAR031512B.htm.  
 57 See Wallop, supra note 51. 
 58 In 2005, an estimated 4.3 percent of GDP accounted for military 
expenditures, the twenty-second highest in the world. See CIA, supra note 56. 
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event, the Greek government improved Athens’s 
infrastructure,59 funded increases in exceptionally strong 
security systems (given the heightened security alarm due to 
the recent 9/11 tragedy), and made the traditional effort to out-
do previous hosts in terms of the Games’ presentation.60 As a 
whole, the government spending involved in the Olympic 
project proved substantial, leading to Prime Minister Costas 
Karamanlis’s bleak 2004 comment: “The public debt exceeds 
even the most pessimistic of estimations.”61 
By 2009, 54% of Greece’s GDP was spent on general 
government expenses,62 such as military defense, public order, 
hospital services, housing, and community amenities.63 In fact, 
21.6% of its GDP was spent on social security funds alone, a 
percentage slightly higher than that of major industrial 
countries such as Belgium and Germany.64 
B. Greece and the Eurozone: Concealing and Exposing 
the Deficit 
During its early membership of the EU, the Greek 
government used extensive and underhanded measures to hide 
the true extent of its deficit from the rest of the Eurozone. 
Starting in 2002, Greece’s debt managers worked with bankers 
of U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs to effect a complex 
“cross-currency swap, in which government debt issued in 
dollars and yen was swapped for euro debt for a certain period—
to be exchanged back into the original currencies at a later 
date.”65 While such transactions are a traditional part of 
government financing, the Greek government “devised a special 
kind of swap with fictional exchange rates” that effectively 
  
 59 Nick Malkoutzis, How the 2004 Olympics Triggered Greece’s Decline, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-
08-02/how-the-2004-olympics-triggered-greeces-decline. 
 60 Greek Debt Spirals After Olympics, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3649268.stm. 
 61 Id. 
 62 European Commission, General Government Expenditure by Function 
(COFOG), EUROPEAN COMMISSION: EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ 
show.do?dataset=gov_a_exp&lang=en (from drop-down menu “sector,” select “general 
government”) (last updated Sept. 5, 2013). 
 63 European Commission, Glossary: General Government Sector—Statistics 
Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_ 
explained/index.php/Glossary:General_government#. 
 64 European Commission, supra note 62 (from drop-down menu “sector,” 
select “social security funds”).  
 65 Beat Balzli, How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt, 
SPIEGEL (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html. 
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enabled the government to hide its liabilities from the rest of the 
Eurozone until a later date.66  
In December 2009, George Papandreou’s Socialists won 
a general election in Greece, a victory largely attributable to 
the people’s anger at the previous government for its failure to 
effectively tackle public corruption and the sinking economy.67 
The same month, Fitch and Moody reduced the Greek debt 
rating from A- to BBB+, marking the first time in a decade that 
Greek sovereign debt rating dropped below A-.68 In February 
2010, George Pandreou revised the 2009 deficit from the 
previously under-reported 5% to a startling 12.7% of GDP.69 
The final revised calculation by Eurostat ultimately brought 
the number up even further to an alarming 15.8% of GDP.70 
The following April, Fitch and Moody nicked their rating of 
Greek sovereign debt down to BBB-, just one level away from 
“junk” status,71 followed that same month by Standard & Poor, 
who slashed Greek debt to a stunning BB+ rating—the upper 
levels of “junk.”72 These reductions in Greek debt ratings incited 
alarm in the financial markets and led to high bond yields.73 
Since 2010, both the Greek government and other 
agencies, such as the EU and the IMF, have taken measures to 
stabilize Greece financially. In 2010, Papandreou’s administration 
announced the implementation of a number of austerity 
  
 66 The “special kind of swap with fictional exchange rates” that Goldman 
Sachs devised for Greece “enabled Greece to receive a far higher sum than the actual 
euro market value of 10 billion dollars or yen. In that way Goldman Sachs secretly 
arranged additional credit of up to $1 billion for the Greeks. This credit disguised as a 
swap didn’t show up in the Greek debt statistics.” Id. For further information on how 
the “currency swap” works, see id.  
 67 See Rachel Donadio & Anthee Carassava, Greek Socialists Win in a 
Landslide, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/world/ 
europe/05greece.html. Regarding corruption, a 2010 study by Transparency 
International (the Berlin-based global “corruption watchdog”) found that the Greeks 
paid an average of 1,355 ($1,830) in bribes that year for services from the public 
sector. See Greek Corruption Booming, Says Transparency International, SPIEGEL 
(Mar. 2, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
0,1518,681184,00.html. 
 68 See Graeme Wearden, Greece Debt Crisis: Timeline, GUARDIAN (May 5, 
2010), www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/05/greece-debt-crisis-timeline. 
 69 See A Very European Crisis, ECONOMIST (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15452594?story_id=15452594. 
 70 See Numbers in Action, ECONOMIST NEWSWEEK BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/11/greek-statistics.  
 71 See Gary Dorsch, Greek Debt Wildfire Engulfs the Euro in Flames, Boosts Gold, 
MKT. ORACLE (May 13, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article19468.html. 
 72 See Dorsch, supra note 71; Lefteris Papadimas & Dave Graham, S&P Cuts Greek 
Debt to Junk, Downgrades Portugal, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2010), www.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/04/27/us-greece-idUSLDE63P0LU20100427. 
 73 See Dorsch, supra note 71; KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 2. 
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packages.74 By 2011, the EU and the IMF had offered Greece two 
bailout loans, both conditional on harsh austerity measures for 
the county.75 The second bailout loan was finally ratified in 2012 
and was conditioned on restructuring packages from Greece’s 
private creditors.76 
C. International and Domestic Reception to Greece’s Debt 
Crisis 
Public fear of a default by Greece greatly increased just 
prior to Greece’s first bailout package77 and again after Greece 
failed to meet the goals set out in that package a year later.78 
According to the Wall Street Journal, in May 2010, the credit 
market found there was a 75% chance of Greece defaulting.79 In 
September 2011, “a poll of more than 50 economists across 
Europe” gave Greece a 65% chance that it would default within 
twelve months.80 
Following Greece’s self-imposed austerity measures in 
early May 2010, the resulting cuts in public spending received 
widespread disapproval from the Greek population, leading to 
violent protests beginning in May 201081 and continuing 
through 201182 and into 2012.83 Among the calls for action by 
these protestors, many objected to the bailout offers from the 
EU and IMF84 and instead demanded a cancellation of Greece’s 
  
 74 See Allen et al., supra note 8. 
 75 See id.; see also Wroughton, supra note 8. 
 76 See Wroughton, supra note 8. 
 77 Aaron Smith, Greek Debt Fears Ease After EU Aid Request, CNN MONEY.COM 
(Apr. 23, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/23/news/international/greek_ 
bonds_prime_minister. 
 78 Emelia Sithole-Matarise, Bond Market Sees High Risk of Eventual Greek 
Default, REUTERS (June 13, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/ 
13/uk-markets-greece-idUKTRE75C3HD20110613. 
 79 Mark Whitehouse, Number of the Week: 75% Chance of Greek Default, 
WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 22, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/05/22/ 
number-of-the-week-75-chance-of-greek-default. 
 80 Jonathan Cable & Andy Bruce, Greece Looks Likely to Default, But Keep Euro, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2011, 7:42 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/idINIndia- 
59386520110916. 
 81 Greece Police Tear Gas Anti-Austerity Protesters, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8655711.stm. 
 82 See Rachel Donadio & Niki Kitsantonis, Thousands in Greece Protest New 
Austerity Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/20/world/europe/greek-workers-start-two-day-anti-austerity-strike.html. 
 83 See Helena Smith, Greek Protesters Fight with Police as Parliament Agrees 
Cuts Deal, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/12/ 
greek-protesters-clash-parliament-austerity. 
 84 See Greece Police Tear Gas Anti-Austerity Protesters, supra note 81. 
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debt altogether.85 2013 witnessed a less violent but nonetheless 
economically damaging protest as Greece’s two main labor 
unions, representing about 2.5 million workers, called a 24-hour 
strike, affecting schools, public transportation, and hospital staff.86 
Nevertheless, the Greek government continued to work with the 
EU and IMF to avoid default despite these protests.87  
At the time of the writing of this note, Greece has 
experienced some positive economic trends—including a 
striking increase in Greece’s major stock index, a lift of 
Greece’s seventeen-month ban on short-selling in stocks, and a 
positive direction for Greek corporate bond sales88—which may 
suggest a return of investor confidence in Greece.89 In a 
February 2013 article, the Wall Street Journal proposed that 
such economic confidence in Greece may signal a “possible 
turning point in the country’s three-year-long debt crisis.”90 
Even then, however, the Wall Street Journal was reluctant to 
be too optimistic, observing that “[t]o be sure, it could all go 
sour again, should social or political tensions erupt anew and 
derail the fragile [reform program].”91  
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 
If we were all responsible for the misdeeds of the governments that 
represent us, thought Isabel, then the moral burden would be just 
too great.92 
The odious debt doctrine should be viewed most 
appropriately as a qualification on, or exception to, the general 
rule that sovereign entities must pay the debts of predecessor 
governments.93 Before the odious debt doctrine, other exceptions 
  
 85 See id.; see also Greek Debt Audit Campaign, Greek Debt Audit Campaign 
Statement, JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/ 
Greek3720Debt3720Audit3720Campaign3720statement+7476.twl. 
 86 Niki Kitsantonis, Greece: Strikers Protest over Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
21, 2013, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/europe/greek-
unions-walk-out-in-austerity-protest.html. 
 87 See CNN Wire Staff, Greek Lawmakers Pass New Austerity Law Despite 
Protests, CNN NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/ 
20/business/greece-austerity-strikes/index.html; see also Greece Timeline, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 12, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1014812.stm. 
 88 See Stelios Bouras & Philip Pangalos, Foreign Money Is Revisiting Greece, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2013, 7:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424127887323864304578320431435196910.html.  
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, FRIENDS, LOVERS, CHOCOLATE 32 (2005). 
 93 See King, supra note 14, at 607. 
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to this basic rule existed as well: for example, “hostile debts”94 
and “war debts.”95 In 1927, the notion of “odious debts” emerged 
and joined this list of exceptions.96 
Alexander Sack, the world’s “preeminent . . . scholar on 
public debt” during the late 1920s,97 coined the term “odious 
debt” in 1927.98 He contended that a sovereign debt is “odious” 
and should be cancelled if the following three elements are 
satisfied: (1) the regime that incurred the debt was despotic, (2) 
the purpose of the debt was against the needs or interest of the 
state, and (3) the creditors were subjectively aware of the first 
two factors at the time they granted the debt.99 The first prong 
advocates on behalf of the people by shifting liability for the 
debt from the state to the ruler personally, being based on the 
principle that a ruler “who does not represent her subjects 
necessarily lacks the legitimacy to act on their behalf.”100 The 
second prong represents a causation requirement: not only 
must the despotic ruler fail to work on behalf of the people, but 
the people must have suffered from it. In contrast to the first 
prong, the third prong takes into account the interests of the 
creditors, by penalizing only those creditors “who actually knew 
prior to extending debt that the ruler was ‘despotic’ and that [the 
despotic ruler’s] expenditures would not benefit the State.”101  
Although Sack was the first to create the term, several 
theorists have developed their own versions of the odious debt 
doctrine, differing from Sacks’ definition to varying degrees.102 
Contemporary usage has focused on three basic factors: (1) 
whether the population consented to the debt, (2) whether the 
  
 94 Generally, the idea of “hostile debts” is similar to that of “odious debt,” 
although it predates the odious debt doctrine and is less doctrinally developed. See 
Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1214-16. 
 95 “War debts” are debts contracted by government in order to defeat an 
enemy. If the enemy overthrows the government, then the enemy is not expected to pay 
back the debts that were intended to further its downfall. See Buchheit et al., supra 
note 14, at 1212-14. 
 96 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 302. 
 97 Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy 
in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 595, 598 (2008). 
 98 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 302. 
 99 See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND 
THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165-66 (1991). 
 100 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 303 (citing Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 
1237-45 (finding that agency law can serve as a proxy for these concerns)). 
 101 See id. (citing ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165). It should be noted that this 
note focuses on the first two prongs, since an inquiry into the subjective awareness of 
Greece’s creditors would require new research which this investigation does not have 
the access to undertake. 
 102 See King, supra note 14, at 621-33. 
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population received any kind of benefit from the debt, (3) and 
whether the creditor was aware of these facts.103 While each of 
these elements may be interpreted individually in varying ways, 
this overall structure and these terms represent the doctrine’s 
most common form as used in scholarly discourses today. 
For over a century, a number of countries have invoked 
the doctrine of odious debt in some form. For example, in 1883, 
Mexico repudiated as odious all debts incurred between 1857 
and 1860 and between 1863 and 1867.104 Also, when the United 
States took control of Cuba from Spain in 1898, the US refused 
to pay Cuba’s debts to Spain, claiming that the debts were 
odious because Spain had imposed the debt without the Cuban 
people’s consent.105 A form of the odious debt doctrine found its 
way to the International Court of Arbitration in 1923, when 
Britain brought Costa Rica to court over Costa Rica’s Law of 
Nullities, a 1922 law “that cancelled all contracts undertaken 
by [its former dictator] from 1917 to 1919,” including loans 
from a British bank.106 Chief Justice Taft upheld Costa Rica’s 
law on the basis that the funds from the loan were not put to a 
“legitimate use.”107 
Although the odious debt doctrine was most recently 
evoked in Iraq and Nigeria, both regimes ultimately declined to 
enforce the doctrine for policy reasons. In 2003, after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, the United States originally declared Iraq’s 
debt to be odious.108 But the United States later decided this 
created a risky precedent and consequently dropped the odious 
debt claim, choosing instead to negotiate with the Paris Club 
for “an 80% cancellation of Iraq’s debts.”109 In a similar turn of 
events, in early 2005, Nigerian President Olusegun Obsanjo 
faced a request from the Nigerian Parliament to repudiate the 
country’s debt, which was incurred largely during military 
dictatorships. President Obsanjo decided instead to negotiate 
with the Paris Club for a 60% reduction of the debt.110 
The odious debt doctrine has received recent attention 
in the context of Greece in light of its ongoing financial crisis. 
  
 103 Id. at 630-31. 
 104 See BENOÎT BOUCHAT ET AL., ECUADOR AT THE CROSS-ROADS: AN INTEGRAL 
AUDIT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT 11 (Elizabeth Anne et al. trans., 2007), available at 
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Among those who claim that Greece should invoke the odious 
debt doctrine to cancel some or all of its staggering debt, the 
creators of the 2011 documentary film, Debtocracy, stand out 
with particular prominence.111 According to its directors, 
Debtocracy received half a million views within a week of its 
release and approximately one million views within its first 
month.112 The arguments advanced in this film fall primarily 
into two categories: (1) the “odious debt”-focused arguments, 
claiming that Greece’s debt is “odious” because the state 
government spent the proceeds without benefit to the Greek 
people;113 and (2) the “odious regime”-focused arguments, 
contending that the Greek government is “odious” for having 
made poor business decisions on behalf of the nation,114 
engaging in “shady deals,”115 and enacting socially repressive 
measures against the people.116 In conclusion, Debtocracy 
argues that this odiousness should permit the cancellation of 
Greece’s debts under the odious debt doctrine.117 The arguments 
advanced by Debtocracy will be discussed more in depth in Part 
VI of this note. As of the writing of this note, there is no sign 
that the Greek government has acknowledged the message 
from Debtocracy. 
As explained in the Introduction, this note seeks to 
analyze the applicability of the odious debt doctrine within the 
context of Greece’s economic crisis. This analysis will conclude 
that the odious debt theory should not be used to release 
Greece from its debts, based on three primary findings: (1) the 
odious debt doctrine fails as a workable rule due to its inherent 
doctrinal and administrative flaws, and therefore should not be 
applied in general; (2) even if the odious debt doctrine were 
applied, the serious policy risks that accompany its use mandate 
  
 111 The film Debtocracy has been distributed online and is available on a 
number of websites. See Aris Chatzistefanou & Katerina Kitidi, Debtocracy, YOUTUBE 
(May 12, 2011), http://youtu.be/qKpxPo-lInk [hereinafter Debtocracy]; see also Aris 
Chatzistefanou & Katerina Kitidi, Greece has Woken Up to Debtocracy, GUARDIAN (July 
9, 2011, 5:00 AM), www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/09/greece-debtocracy. 
 112 Id. 
 113 For example, Debtocracy criticizes the government for its excessive 
spending, including the amount of loan proceeds spent on the 2004 Olympic Games. 
See Debtocracy, supra note 111, at 1:02:00. 
 114 See infra note 179. 
 115 See infra note 180. 
 116 For example, the documentary criticizes the government’s implementation 
and acceptance of the number of financial austerity measures, describing the effect of 
these measures on the Greek people’s quality of life. “[T]he government has turned against 
the people with harsh austerity measures.” See Debtocracy, supra note 111 at 28:53. 
 117 See id. at 1:08:00. 
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a narrow interpretation of the doctrine, so as to limit its reach 
to only exceptional cases; and (3) under a narrow interpretation 
of the odious debt doctrine, Greece would not be eligible to 
cancel its debt. The next three Parts will discuss each of those 
findings in turn. 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE ODIOUS DEBT 
DOCTRINE AS A WHOLE 
This Part will show how the odious debt doctrine is 
plagued by doctrinal defects and administrative weaknesses, 
which strongly discourage the doctrine’s general use altogether. 
It should be noted for sake of clarity that while diverging views 
exist as to the most appropriate interpretation of the odious 
debt doctrine (e.g. narrow or liberal), the next Part will 
introduce that discussion. Here, Part IV counsels against the 
doctrine’s use as a whole, given its inherent flaws.  
A. Doctrinal Weaknesses 
Given that its key terms are inherently vague and 
unexplained, the odious debt principle is a doctrinally weak 
concept. For example, the very heart of the odious debt doctrine 
itself, the word “odious,” remains remarkably undefined. The 
distinction between “odious debt” and the much broader 
concept of “onerous debt” is often confusing.118 In particular, 
great difficulty arises in attempting to discern the line between 
debt that is “odious” and debt that is “‘merely’ . . . excessive, 
burdensome, and difficult or impossible to service.”119 Other key 
words in the odious debt doctrine are also ambiguous, including 
the terms “absence of consent” in the first element and 
“absence of benefit” in the second.120 The gaping doctrinal holes 
left by these critical yet undefined terms make the odious debt 
doctrine susceptible to self-serving interpretations and lack of 
uniformity in application, among possible other dangers.121 
Altogether, given these fundamental defects, the odious debt 
doctrine fails as a workable and comprehensible rule. 
  
 118 Ochoa, supra note 13, at 152. 
 119 Id. (distinguishing between “odious” debt and “onerous” debt). 
 120 See infra Part VI.A. 
 121 Part VI will introduce the different ways the doctrine can be interpreted as 
a result of this vagueness. 
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B. Administrative Weaknesses 
In the hypothetical case that the odious debt doctrine 
were sufficiently unambiguous to qualify as a rule of law, its 
enforcement would require some kind of authority to apply the 
doctrine to the merits of each sovereign debtor’s case. As 
Buchheit observes, were we to leave the judgment in the hands 
of the lender, “the municipality of Rome would still be paying 
off Caligula’s gambling debts.”122 The sovereign debtor is of 
course equally unqualified to consider the merits of its own 
odious debt claim, having “every economic motivation to paint 
its predecessor in an unflattering light.”123 In solution, Sack 
advocated the formation of an impartial, international tribunal to 
enforce the doctrine.124 This analysis will show, however, how the 
administrative technicalities involved in such an adjudication 
process are exceptionally complicated—specifically the projects 
of choosing qualified judges, ensuring impartiality, and 
locating the necessary evidence.  
One of the criticisms of Sack’s “impartial, international 
tribunal”125 proposal is that the task of finding qualified judges to 
assume such roles would be too difficult, if not virtually impossible. 
For example, Bradley Lewis denounces the odious debt doctrine as 
“judicially inadministrable[,] because it requires judges to answer 
inherently political questions . . . .”126 Lewis found that judges 
“simply cannot systematically distinguish between odious and non-
odious governments.”127 Similarly, the author Tai-Heng Cheng 
indicated that government successions are too political for a hard-
and-fast rule like the odious debt doctrine.128  
Another criticism is that the requirement for “impartial 
judges” may be a naïve expectation. In other words, not only 
would an “impartial, international tribunal” require finding 
judges qualified to be entrusted with international decision-
making, but also without connections to the country in distress, 
the countries of its creditors, and any countries who might be 
adversely or beneficially affected by the result. Especially 
  
 122 Buchheit et al., supra note 14 at 1229. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 1223. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Lewis, supra note 11, at 305. 
 127 Id. at 308 (citing Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious 
Regimes?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 90 (2007)). 
 128 See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 123; see also Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating 
the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 21 (2007). 
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considering our modern global economy—not to mention the often 
international impact of sovereign bankruptcy—this presents a 
daunting, if not impossible, task. Moreover, especially given the 
uniqueness of every nation’s interstate politics and economics, 
each new claimant under the odious debt doctrine may likely 
require a new and specialized search for impartial judges. 
Moreover, a question arises as to who or what authority 
should decide those critical questions, initiate the process, and 
determine the impartiality of the judges. Impartiality presents 
an issue here as well, since allowing either the sovereign-
debtor or the creditors to take over that managerial role may 
raise a bias concern. 
Even if an impartial tribunal were successfully 
instated,129 the adjudication process still presents other 
complications. For example, the need to show that a debt was 
used for odious purposes would require identifying the uses of 
the loan proceeds. But, as Christiana Ochoa points out: “[I]t 
has been nearly impossible to uncover forensic information 
about how despotic regimes actually finance themselves.”130 The 
difficulties involved in discerning this vital information, not to 
mention proving it to the tribunal, complicate this task 
significantly. Another potential evidentiary complexity relates 
to proof of the third prong of the odious debt doctrine: the 
creditor’s subjective awareness of that the debts were for 
odious purposes.131 The “subjectivity” of that element requires 
an inquiry into the mind of the creditor specifically, which 
presents a formidable evidentiary challenge for the sovereign-
claimant. Absent any records of communication between the 
sovereign-claimant and the creditor exhibiting as much, the 
best or only proof of the creditor’s “subjective” knowledge may 
be in the creditor’s own files. Considering that the sovereign-
claimant requires this evidence in order to prove a claim 
against the creditor, access to the creditor’s files for this 
purpose may prove a nearly impossible task. 
  
 129 As a point of interest, the author Jeff King finds the broad concern over the 
impartial tribunal concept to be overstated, believing there to be “ample precedents” of 
such tribunals. See, e.g., King, supra note 14, at 653 & 666. King also dismisses the 
task of interpreting the doctrine’s ambiguous terms as being “not beyond the 
competence of what courts or tribunals can do or in fact have done and continue to do 
in domestic law.” See id. at 666. 
 130 Ochoa, supra note 13, at 131. 
 131 See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND 
THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165-66 (1991). 
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Notably, the impartial tribunal will likely confer a 
degree of deference on the financial decisions of the state 
officials who incurred the debt. The author King observes that 
a tribunal instated to adjudicate under the odious debt doctrine 
will probably use a standard of review that will “doubtless be 
deferential to the views of public officials” and will likely deem 
“only egregious examples of harmful conduct” as odious.132 
Altogether, as with the doctrinal flaws, the administrative 
defects involved with the odious debt concept counsel against its 
use altogether, or at least favor its limited application. 
V. POLICY PROBLEMS OF A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION 
This Part will introduce the note’s second finding: that 
the odious debt doctrine should be interpreted narrowly because 
liberal interpretations exacerbate serious policy concerns and 
increase the risk of dangerous precedents. Even its creator 
advocated for a restrictive application.133 According to Lee 
Buchheit, Sack “would have recoiled at casually branding debts 
as odious,” as some modern advocates attempt to do.134 After 
investigating the serious policy risks that accompany a liberal 
interpretation of the odious debt doctrine, this Part similarly 
concludes in favor of a narrow application. 
To this end, this Part first will explain how the odious 
debt doctrine is commonly viewed through one of two lenses: 
“odious regime” and “odious debt.” This first section will continue 
to explain how these two approaches qualify as “narrow” or 
“liberal” interpretations of the doctrine: narrow, in that the 
interpretation would limit the doctrine to only a few, select 
situations, and liberal, in that the interpretation would apply the 
doctrine to a more expansive set of situations. The second 
section of this Part will advance some of the policy concerns 
associated with the odious debt doctrine, which increase 
dramatically as the doctrine is interpreted more liberally. 
Accordingly, this Part will conclude that because of the increased 
  
 132 King, supra note 14, at 666. 
 133 For example, when the Soviet government in 1918 claimed that it, a 
government of “workers and peasants,” had the legal right to repudiate the debts 
incurred by the former Russian “landlords and bourgeoisie” governments, Alexander 
Sack openly balked at the proposal. See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1223-24. 
Furthermore, sometime after he proposed his odious debt doctrine, Sack wrote that 
state public debts are a “charge upon the territory of the State”—that is, within the 
financial responsibility of the state. Id. (citing Alexander Sack, The Juridical Nature of 
the Public Debt of States, 10 N.Y.U. L. REV. 341, 357-58 (1932)). 
 134 Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1223. 
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policy problems associated with a liberal interpretation, the 
doctrine should only be interpreted narrowly. 
A. Narrow vs. Liberal Interpretation of the Odious Debt 
Doctrine 
In order to examine the liberal and narrow 
interpretations of the odious debt doctrine, the analysis must 
first be divided into two parts: an “odious regime” and an 
“odious debt” analysis. This division is necessary due to some 
confusion about the very crux of the doctrine itself: the word 
“odious.” The placement of this adjective has been a subject of 
disagreement among scholars. One view, and the traditional 
Sackian approach, would look for an “odious” debt and a 
“despotic” regime.135 Despite this, recent scholarly discourse 
reveals a tendency among other scholars to shift the modifying 
“odious” adjective away from the word “debt” and instead 
towards the word “regime”136—which dramatically changes the 
application of the odious debt doctrine. Given these two 
diverging approaches, the details of the “odious regime” 
variation and those of the “odious debt” alternative will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. The “Odious Regime” Variation: A Liberal Standard 
The “odious regime” approach does not require an 
analysis of the sovereign’s debt at all but instead focuses solely 
on the nature of the government, which allows this variation to 
cover a more expansive set of situations.137 That is, if the state 
can show its previous government to have been an “odious” one, 
then all debts incurred by that odious government are liable to 
be lawfully repudiated, regardless of their uses.138 Meanwhile, 
under this logic, debts incurred by a virtuous government and 
used for the same purposes would be upheld. 
In short, by focusing exclusively on the nature of the 
government, this standard could potentially cancel both odious 
and non-odious debts, depending on the nature of the 
  
 135 See ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165-66. 
 136 See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1223 (citing Anna Gelpern, Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring: What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 391, 393 (2005); Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 47; Seema Jayachandran & 
Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 85-87 (2006)). 
 137 See Buchheit et al., supra note 14 at 1222. 
 138 See id. 
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government. This expansiveness shows the “odious regime” 
standard to be a very liberal one. 
2. The “Odious Debt” Variation: Interpreted Both 
Liberally and Narrowly 
The “odious debt” standard focuses on the debts 
themselves, and attempts to distinguish between loans beneficial 
to the people and loans used for personal enrichment.139 This 
definition is more loyal to the original Sackian concept of the 
doctrine of odious debt.140 This approach may also seem more 
logically cohesive than the “odious regime” approach, because 
the punishment (the cancellation of loans) has a direct, causal 
relation to the injustice (the loans not benefiting the people).141 
The “odious debt” standard is more complex than its 
“odious regime” counterpart, because the elements of the 
“odious debt” version are subject to both narrow and liberal 
interpretations, while the alternative “odious regime” version 
remains only a liberal standard. 
For example, the phrase “absence of consent” in the 
doctrine’s first prong can be interpreted both narrowly and 
liberally. Sack meant to contain the odious debt doctrine to 
despotic regimes only142—thus under Sack’s approach, since a 
despot “does not represent her subjects,”143 the people’s lack of 
consent is automatically presumed. His contemporary, 
Feilchenfeld, expanded the odious debt doctrine to include debts 
incurred without the population’s consent by any form of regime 
but suggested the form of government may give rise to inference 
of consent.144 For example, non-consent may be presumed in 
  
 139 See Bolton, supra note 127, at 83, 88. It should be noted that even when 
applying the “odious debt” variation, the odiousness of the regime is still a relevant 
question, as it can inform other elements. For example, if it were established that the 
government was blatantly and prevalently known to be corrupt, this might shed light 
on the third element: whether the creditors knew that the proceeds of their loans were 
not serving the interests of the people. See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1226. 
 140 Sack himself stipulated that any debts contracted in furtherance of “the needs 
or . . . interest of the State” must be considered non-odious. ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165. 
 141 In contrast, the “odious regime” approach punishes creditors with a 
cancellation of loans, even in cases where the government was odious for reasons other 
than the loan usage. 
 142 See ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165-66. 
 143 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 303 (citing Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 
1237-45 (finding that agency law can serve as a proxy for these concerns)). 
 144 ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 704 
(1931); see King, supra note 14, at 631 (analyzing what “absence of consent” might 
mean to different forms of government, not just despotic ones, in other words 
“parliamentary bod[ies] . . . elected on the basis of what are generally regarded as 
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dictatorial governments, but in democracies, the people’s choice 
to elect officials may evince the people’s “consent” to the elected 
officials’ subsequent decisions.145 Feilchenfeld’s interpretation of 
the “absence of consent” element is narrow, given that it likely 
prevents democracies from invoking the odious debt doctrine.146 
Alternatively, a liberal interpretation of “absence of 
consent” treats that element as automatically satisfied by a 
showing of the second element. In other words, proof of the 
“absence of benefit” prong creates a presumption that an 
“absence of consent” exists as well, based on the logic that a 
population would naturally refuse to consent to something that 
is not for their benefit. 
This brings the discussion to the “absence of benefit” 
element. The question of determining whether people felt the 
“benefit” of a loan remains a subject of much discussion. Sack 
also advocated a narrow meaning of “absence of benefit,”147 
choosing to limit the term’s meaning to instances of despotic 
self-enrichment: “When a despotic regime contracts a debt, not 
for the needs or in the interest of the state, but rather to 
  
normal majority rules,” “absolute government[s],” and “representative bod[ies] not 
elected by the application of fair and normal rules”). 
 145 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 144, at 704. 
 146 Feilchenfeld’s interpretation aligns with Sack’s underlying principle for the 
odious debt doctrine: namely, that a ruler “who does not represent her subjects 
necessarily lacks the legitimacy to act on their behalf.” Lewis, supra note 11, at 302-03. 
In other words, in a democracy, the elected officials are directly chosen by the people, 
thus such officials would represent the people whenever making decisions in their roles 
as such officials. See Thomas S. Wyler, Wiping the Slate: Maintaining Capital Markets 
While Addressing the Odious Debt Dilemma, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 947, 967-68 (finding 
that “[i]f a democratically elected regime, for example, contracted a debt for some 
detestable purpose, it could not be deemed odious since it was not incurred by a despot”). 
In a democracy, the elected officials are directly chosen by the people, thus such officials 
would represent the people in perhaps the most direct way possible. 
 147 Indeed, a strict reading of Sack’s interpretation would constrain the odious 
debt doctrine to an even narrower context, given that Sack places emphasis on whether 
the debt was incurred for the benefit of the state, regardless of how the proceeds were 
in fact used. See Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 15-16; see also Gèunter Frankenberg 
& Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of Developing Countries: The 
Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT’L J. SOC. L. 415, 428 (1984). 
In other words, in cases where the loan was “contracted for the benefit of a state and 
with general consent, but subsequently spent on items that are in fact of no benefit to 
the population,” Sack would require the debtor state “to repay even in the absence of 
benefit, for the debts were in fact incurred for the benefit of the state.” Khalfan et al., 
supra note 14, at 15-16. This approach finds the injustice of the “odious debt” to arise 
from an abuse of rights when the debt was contracted, and not from the excessive 
burdens to the regime successor. See Frankenberg & Knieper, supra, at 428. 
Nevertheless, this note has uncovered limited scholarly attention to this extremely 
strict reading of Sack’s approach and therefore, for the purposes of establishing a 
narrow interpretation of the odious debt doctrine, rejects this strict reading in favor of 
a more popularly-used narrow approach. 
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strengthen itself, to suppress a popular insurrection, etc, [sic] 
this debt is odious . . . .”148  
Similarly, authors Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, and Bryan 
Thomas also suggest a narrow interpretation by proposing four 
pre-defined scenarios that would constitute prima facie cases of 
an absence of benefit:  
(1) where proceeds are spent for personal enrichment; (2) where the 
proceeds are spent on arms or military expenses used in a manner 
contrary to the interests of the population, (3) where the proceeds are 
spent on infrastructure distributed in a severely discriminatory manner; 
and (4) where the funds were used to promote oppressive institutions.149  
Additionally, authors Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu 
Gulati “point [out] that populations often do benefit” at least in 
part from the “debt incurred by despotic regimes.”150 To the 
extent that these populations have benefited, these authors 
conclude that the “populations and creditors should share 
liability” in a way that reflects the “relative blameworthiness 
and benefits of each.”151 By restricting the “absence of benefit” 
element to only pre-defined situations where the population 
received no benefit at all from the loan’s proceeds, these 
authors advocate a narrow interpretation of the term. 
Because this note sets out to analyze the odious debt 
doctrine through the lens of Greece’s debts, this analysis 
requires an interpretation of “absence of benefit” that will be 
liberal enough to encompass the ways the Greek government 
used their loan proceeds, which include, for example, excessive 
spending on the public sector and expenditure for the 2004 
Olympics. For this purpose, this note proposes a liberal 
interpretation of “absence of benefit” that includes the use of a 
debt in a way that proves to conflict with the long-term interests 
of the population, even if the population feels a short-term 
benefit from the loans. This is more expansive than previous 
interpretations because, traditionally, the odious debt doctrine 
was limited to cases where the people received no benefit at all 
from the loans. As will be discussed more in depth later, this 
  
 148 Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 14. 
 149 Id. at 45. The author expands on a third scenario (where “the proceeds are 
spent on infrastructure distributed in a severely discriminatory manner”) in a footnote, 
explaining that this is meant to mean “systematic discrimination such as apartheid, 
rampant nepotism or corruption such as in Indonesia.” Id. at 45 n.181 (footnote omitted). 
 150 See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 122; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, 
Partially Odious Debts?: A Framework for an Optimal Liability Regime, 71 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-49 (2007). 
 151 Id.  
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liberal interpretation of “absence of benefit” would encompass 
Greece’s situation because the government’s spending, including 
that on the public sector and the 2004 Olympics, caused a long-
term detriment to the Greek people, even though they initially 
felt the benefits of those expenditures.152 
B. Policy Concerns Support a Narrow Interpretation 
This section concludes that only a narrow interpretation 
of the odious debt doctrine should be adopted because of the 
serious policy concerns involved in the liberal versions. For 
example, the subjectivity of the “odious regime” standard 
threatens inconsistency in application, self-interested opinions 
permeating the adjudication, and an inappropriate authority 
deciding political questions.153 The “odious debt” standard also 
comes with serious policy risks, including the risk of 
incentivizing sovereigns to mismanage the country or to exploit 
local resources as an alternative venue for financing, 
disincentivizing lenders to lend, and discouraging sovereigns 
from correcting the deficiencies in their regulatory systems 
that produced their financial crises in the first place.154 While 
these policy problems apply to the odious debt doctrine in 
general, the risks increase dramatically as the doctrine is 
interpreted more liberally.  
As such, this section will first address the policy 
problems with the “odious regime” variation of the doctrine and 
then will look at the policy concerns associated with the “odious 
debt” standard. Given the heightened policy concerns involved 
in the liberal odious debt standard, this section concludes that a 
liberal interpretation must be rejected in favor of a narrow one. 
1. Policy Concerns Involving the “Odious Regime” 
Standard 
The overarching problem with the “odious regime” 
variation is that it presents a dangerously subjective standard. 
This approach is subjective because it requires a discernment 
of what makes a regime “odious.” As one author opined: 
“Odiousness—whether of regimes, individuals, or certain cooked 
  
 152 See infra Part VI.A.2. 
 153 See infra Part V.B.1. 
 154 See infra Part V.B.2. 
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green vegetables—is a subjective concept.”155 As discussed 
further below, a subjective standard not only threatens 
inconsistent interpretations, but it also leaves the doctrine at 
the mercy of self-interested opinions.  
First, a subjective standard, such as the “odious regime” 
approach, is undesirable because it threatens to yield 
inconsistent findings as to what is “odious.” American civil and 
constitutional case law has approached subjective standards 
very warily because of the risk of inconsistent results, finding 
that subjective standards yield results “as variable as the 
length of the foot of each individual.”156 Toward this end, some 
authors have suggested installing an impartial, international 
tribunal to ensure consistent results across the board.157 
However, even if an impartial tribunal were chosen to 
promote some kind of uniformity in the “odious regime” 
interpretation, the subjective judgment behind this standard 
still risks self-interested opinions pervading the adjudication. 
For example, leaving the definition of “odious” to subjective 
impressions requires judges to make determinations about the 
inherently political issues of diverse countries.158 This presents 
the risk of ethnocentrism entering into the equation.159 For 
example, to what extent may “odious” findings be based on the 
principles of the judge’s culture? That is, if a government 
mandates or encourages cultural practices that are criticized in 
other societies, such as public beatings or female circumcision, 
is that in itself enough to make the government “odious”? Are 
all dictatorships automatically odious?160 Also, are certain civil 
rights required of a non-odious government, and if so, which 
ones?161 By requiring individuals to cast judgments on the 
  
 155 Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1228. 
 156 See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (3 Bing. N. C. 468, 475) (1837) 
(Tindle, J. concurring) (choosing an objective standard over a subjective one, stating: 
“Instead . . . of saying that the liability for negligence should be coextensive with the 
judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of 
each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a 
regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe”). Also, American 
constitutional law has struck down legislation that has based culpability on “wholly 
subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal 
meanings,” such as whether the defendant’s behavior was “annoying” or “indecent.” See 
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008). Arguably, the word “odious” might 
have an even less universal meaning than those impermissible examples provided. 
 157 See supra Part IV.B. 
 158 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 305 (citing Bolton & Skeel, supra note 127, at 83, 90). 
 159 See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1228. 
 160 See id. 
 161 See id.at 1229. 
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practices of a society that is not their own, cultural biases will 
likely play a role. 
Altogether, given the purely subjective basis of “odious 
regime” variation and its accompanying risks, these serious 
policy concerns require rejection of this standard in favor of an 
alternative interpretation. 
2. Policy Concerns Involving the “Odious Debt” 
Standard 
Like the “odious regime” variation, the “odious debt” 
approach involves significant policy risks, which increase 
dramatically as the standard is interpreted more liberally. 
One policy concern is that the odious debt doctrine 
incentivizes despotism or government mismanagement. Through 
its third prong, the doctrine directs the punishment for a 
government’s odious spending on the lenders, a third party. 
Thus, an international implementation of the odious debt 
doctrine could easily strip from a corrupt ruler any lingering 
incentives to refrain from contracting and spending loans for 
self-enrichment purposes. In other words, despite the doctrine’s 
moral and normative goals, the doctrine ironically encourages 
despotic governments to continue their self-serving expenditures 
at the people’s expense. Greece’s situation exemplifies this risk. 
If Greece were permitted to cancel its debts through the odious 
debt doctrine, this may promote moral hazard among other 
sovereigns.162 That is, such precedent would incentivize devious 
state officials to “work the system” by borrowing money 
recklessly while at the same time either maintaining fiscally 
unsound economic policies or deliberately overspending in 
confidence that their mismanagement will ultimately entitle 
the country to a cancellation of the loans. These risks call for a 
very narrow interpretation of the odious debt doctrine so as to 
eliminate these incentives. 
Since the odious debt doctrine would discourage lending 
to despots, another policy concern is that despots alternatively 
will turn to “funds from sources that may harm” the country.163 
By placing a burden on creditors, the odious debt doctrine 
would prove a strong deterrence for lenders from engaging in 
  
 162 Cf. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1010 (2004) (finding a similar moral hazard risk is 
involved in IMF lending and support packages). 
 163 See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 110. 
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transactions with governments known to be despotic. If a 
despot is deprived of borrowing from lenders, it may likely 
resort to domestic means of financing its interests: for example, 
sale of land or other valuable state assets,164 natural resource 
extraction contracts, and other forms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI).165 Such exploitations by the despotic 
government would likely harm the country’s economic resources, 
natural environment, and population at least as much as the debt 
would.166 “Given the odious debt doctrine’s moral imperatives and 
normative goals,” Ochoa writes, “it seems unreasonable to develop 
a functional odious debt doctrine that will give despots cognizable 
incentives to make yet more use of these (potentially more 
harmful) methods of financing their regimes.”167 Thus, while 
purporting to be a remedial measure, the odious debt doctrine 
runs the risk of being equally or more destructive than the 
situation it would attempt to circumvent. If Greece were allowed 
to invoke the odious debt doctrine, the resulting precedent would 
set the stage for this policy concern to become a reality.  
Additionally, just the “absence of benefit” element alone 
provides a substantial disincentive to lenders when interpreted 
liberally. As defined earlier, a liberal application of “absence of 
benefit” prong would expand the doctrine to encompass 
situations where the population actually felt the benefits, so 
long as these benefits eventually turned into long-term 
detriments.168 The expansiveness of this term, however, would 
place an enormous burden of foreseeability on lenders. In other 
words, the liberal interpretation of the “absence of benefit” prong 
requires lenders not only to predict how the borrowing state will 
potentially use the loans but additionally to forecast the possible 
long-term impact of those potential uses—a very demanding 
burden. Given the high liquidity of the international lending 
market,169 lenders would likely be easily dissuaded by this high risk 
of investment loss and would choose to put their money elsewhere.  
  
 164 See id. at 131 n.115. 
 165 See id. at 131. For more information about FDI, see id. at 136. 
 166 For a more in-depth examination of these harms, see id. at 130-52. 
 167 Id. at 110. 
 168 This is exemplified by Greece’s “decade-long consumer and public sector 
spending boom”: a series of short-term benefits to the people, all of which eventually drove 
the country into bankruptcy. MANOLOPOULOS, supra note 10, at 21; see also supra Part II. 
 169 See Albert H. Choi & Eric Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 
70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 36 (2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/ 
lcp/vol70/iss3/4 (commenting on the high liquidity of the international lending market, 
such that “investors should be able to find nearly as good opportunities” if dissuaded 
from lending to dictatorial regimes). 
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On a related note, these lender disincentives caused by 
the odious doctrine would also negatively affect other countries’ 
financial opportunities.170 Countries “often need to finance 
significant amounts of investment to foster the level of 
economic and social development they desire”171 but usually 
cannot afford such investments merely using domestic funds.172 
These problems exist even more acutely for developing 
countries. As such, opportunities to borrow in the private sector 
play a very important role for these countries.173 A liberal 
interpretation of the odious debt standard, however, critically 
threatens these opportunities. As mentioned earlier, the third 
element of the odious debt doctrine places a responsibility on 
the creditor to detect and withhold funds from seemingly odious 
governments.174 If the odious debt doctrine were interpreted 
liberally, a widespread application would dramatically increase 
the risk of investments in sovereign debt. Lenders would likely 
respond to this increased risk by either refusing to extend loans or 
by charging higher interest rates,175 which would likely deprive 
other countries of advantageous borrowing opportunities.176 
  
 170 Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 136, at 1 (finding that the risk 
presents when lenders, discouraged by illegitimate governments, stop lending to 
“legitimate” governments as well). 
 171 See Brenneman, supra note 27, at 652. 
 172 Brenneman explains this further: “Savings rates are often low in such 
countries, and export revenue is usually insufficient to meet financing needs. Often, 
tax receipts do not cover budgetary outlays.” Also, while the World Bank and other 
such entities offer “official development assistance” to an extent, “this source of 
resources has been shrinking for many years.” Id. (citing César Calderón et al., 
“Determinants of Current Account Deficits in Developing Countries” 28 tbl.2 (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2398, 2000), available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2398; Derek 
Huang Chiat Chen, Intertemporal Excess Burden, Bequest Motives, and the Budget 
Deficit, at 48 fig.2.1 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3086, 2003), 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/IC5I4ZMQ40. 
 173 See Brenneman, supra note 27, at 652 (citing Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra 
Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Response Sought from 
International Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 246 (2004)). 
 174 See ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165-66. 
 175 Choi & Posner, supra note 169, at 35.  
 176 Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 112, at 83 (finding that “[i]f creditors 
anticipated [that they would not be] able to collect on [even] legitimate loans, the debt 
market would shut down”). These authors present an interesting solution to the policy 
problems of the odious debt doctrine: instead of designating an impartial tribunal to 
adjudicate the matter after-the-fact, Jayachandran and Kremer propose empowering a 
committee to determine only whether future loans to a government would be odious. 
Thus, loans can be cancelled under the odious debt doctrine only if they were incurred 
despite being labeled “odious” by the designated committee in advance. This proposal, 
if adopted, would be too late for Greece’s situation, but nevertheless advances an 
interesting theory. 
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Finally, the odious debt doctrine may diminish or 
eliminate the regime’s incentive to restructure their budget 
and governmental system. In Greece’s situation, for example, 
the need to pay its creditors will force the government to 
fundamentally restructure its system of public expenditure.177 
Allowing a release of debt could take away, or at least 
discourage, the government’s incentive to do so. 
Given the risks that accompany the odious debt 
doctrine, it logically follows that an increase in the doctrine’s 
invocation would yield an increase in the risk of these policy 
problems. Since a liberal interpretation encompasses a more 
expansive set of situations, therefore only a narrow application 
of the odious debt doctrine is warranted in order to reduce of 
the threat of these policy concerns,. 
VI. APPLICATION TO GREECE 
Given the narrow and liberal interpretations of the 
odious debt doctrine, this section will demonstrate that Greece 
requires application of a liberal standard—that is, either the 
“odious regime” standard or the liberal interpretation of the 
“odious debt” standard—in order to qualify for release from its 
debts. On the other hand, Greece would not be eligible under 
the narrow interpretation of the “odious debt” standard. 
A. Greece Requires a Liberal Interpretation to Qualify 
To reach its the conclusion that Greece is only eligible 
under liberal interpretations of the doctrine, this Part 
considers the arguments advanced by the creators of the 
documentary film Debtocracy, who are foremost proponents of 
Greece invoking the odious debt doctrine.178 As before, these 
arguments are most clearly introduced by analyzing them in 
turn under the “odious regime” standard and then under that 
of “odious debt.” 
  
 177 See Alberto Mingardi, Greece and the National Moral Hazard Problem, 
DAILY CALLER (July 1, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/07/01/greece-and-
the-national-moral-hazard-problem/ (finding that the Greek crisis constituted a “useful 
lesson” that will bring the population of Greece to “demand a fundamental 
restructuring of public expenditure,” whereupon Greece, “[f]orced to face the 
truth, . . . might, paradoxically, end up better off five years from now than countries 
where the political classes are disguising the need for reform”). 
 178 See Chatzistefanou & Kitidi, supra note 113. 
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1. The “Odious Regime” Variation May Be Favorable to 
Greece 
Some of the arguments in Debtrocracy in favor of Greece 
invoking the odious debt doctrine are based on the nature of 
the government rather than on the use of the loan proceeds, 
including evidence of the Greek government’s poor business 
decisions,179 involvement in corrupt transactions,180 failure to 
correct the widespread corruption problem in the country,181 and 
implementation of austere financial measures to the detriment 
of the people’s quality of life.182 These claims would find 
relevance only under the “odious regime” standard because they 
do not focus on the uses of the debt proceeds.183 As discussed 
previously, the “odious regime” standard is a very liberal one, 
given that it encompasses a more expansive set of situations.184 
The question presented in this section is whether these 
arguments would succeed under the “odious regime” approach. 
This is a difficult question to answer, because the “odious 
regime” standard turns on such a subjective term as “odious.” 
Hypothetically speaking, on one hand, an impartial tribunal185 
might agree that underhanded transactions and administrative 
oversights might indeed make the government an “odious” one. 
Additionally, it is even less clear whether a judge would find 
that the Greek government was “odious” Greek government for 
having made detrimental business decisions, as a judge may be 
  
 179 For example, the film addresses the Greek government’s failure to 
maintain a budget, and criticizes the Greek government’s decision to become a part of 
the EU, on the basis that Greece could not keep up with the competition between 
Eurozone countries. One spokesperson compared the competition between Greece and 
the more economically stable countries of the Eurozone to a “featherweight boxer” in 
the ring with “Muhammad Ali.” Id at 13:05. The documentary also questioned the 
Greek government’s decision to hire a former Goldman Sachs employee to lead the 
Greek Public Debt Management Agency, on the basis that an employee of Goldman 
Sachs was equivalent to a “criminal” and thus could not be relied on to handle Greece’s 
financial affairs in the best interests of the state. Id. at 58:09. In another example, the 
film criticized the government’s decision to import foreign military arms, especially 
from Germany, even when during the financial crisis. Id. at 59:43. 
 180 Id. at 1:03:15. Debtocracy provides as an example the underhanded “cross 
currency swaps” made by the Greek government in collaboration with Goldman Sachs 
in order to hide the extent of Greece’s deficit from the EU, id. at 56:51, which was 
discussed in Part II, supra. The film also mentions a scandal involving the German 
electronics company Siemens, who contracted with Greece for inflated contract prices, 
allegedly due to bribing certain Greek officials. Id. at 55:18 
 181 See Greek Corruption Booming, Says Transparency International, supra note 67. 
 182 See Chatzistefanou & Kitidi, supra note 113. 
 183 See supra Part V.A.1. 
 184 See id. 
 185 For a discussion about the theory of creating an international, impartial 
tribunal to adjudicate the merits of each odious debt case, refer to Part IV.A, supra. 
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inclined to follow a kind of “business judgment rule” 
approach.186 In other words, a judge might prefer to presume 
that the government’s business decisions were based on “sound 
judgment,”187 rather than to question whether the government 
engaged in “odious” breaches of its fiduciary duty to the people. 
Even if a judge were to find the Greek government to be 
guilty of “odious” conduct based on these factors, she would be 
utilizing a very unconventional notion of “odious regime,” since 
the term usually applies to despots or clearly self-serving 
leaders.188 While some of the corruption may qualify as “self-
serving,” other aspects of the deceitful behavior reflect 
measures made for the advancement of the country, however 
misguided or unethical they may seem. For example, the 
elaborate spending on the public sector, in the form of public 
sector wages and social programs (as discussed in Part IV), 
reflects that loan proceeds went toward the needs of the people 
and not to the Greek officials themselves. Even the Greek 
government’s 2001 illicit method of gaining membership into 
the Eurozone—while clearly underhanded—was performed to 
benefit the country by gaining the highly beneficial interest 
rates that the euro currency involved.189 Thus, under a 
conventional notion of “odious” as described above, even this 
grievous instance of deceitful conduct might not be considered 
“self-serving” so as to qualify. 
In short, since this standard remains an incredibly 
subjective one, it does not offer a strong answer either way. For 
the purposes of this examination, however, this note will assume 
that under the liberal “odious regime” standard, an impartial 
judge could subjectively conclude that Greece qualifies. 
  
 186 For more discussion on the business judgment rule, see Sinclair Oil Corp. 
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that “[a] board of directors enjoys a 
presumption of sound business judgment” and therefore “[a] court . . . will not 
substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment”); see also 
Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) (holding that courts will not 
examine “the wisdom of the [contested] decision itself,” but only whether the decision 
was “reached by a proper process”). 
 187 Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp. supra note 186 at 49. 
 188 See Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 14. 
 189 See supra Part II.A. 
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2. While a Liberal Interpretation of the “Odious Debt” 
Variation Is Favorable to Greece, a Narrow 
Interpretation Is Not 
As explained earlier, the “odious debt” standard involves 
greater complexity than its “odious regime” counterpart due to 
its potential for both liberal and narrow interpretations. This 
section will demonstrate that only a liberal interpretation of the 
“odious debt” standard would absolve Greece of its debt obligations.  
Of the three elements of the odious debt doctrine, 
Greece would fail the “absent of consent” prong under 
Feilchenfeld’s narrow interpretation.” As discussed in Part V.A, 
Feilchenfeld finds that a democracy triggers a strong presumption 
of the people’s consent.190 Here, Greece was a democratic regime 
during the time it contracted the vast majority of its loans,191 and 
therefore under Feilchenfeld’s narrow interpretation, Greece 
likely fails the “absence of consent” requirement as a result of 
this presumption. 
The next question is whether Greece would qualify 
under a liberal definition of “absence of consent.” Under the 
liberal approach, as discussed previously, “absence of consent” is 
presumed when an “absence of benefit” is shown. Accordingly, 
this particular examination turns on an analysis of the 
differences between the narrow and liberal interpretations of the 
“absence of benefit” element. 
Turning to “absence of benefit,” the narrow interpretation 
would exclude Greece. Greece incurred the majority of its loans 
during the time that Greece’s social government ran deficits to 
finance public sector jobs and social programs, such as pensions.192 
  
 190 See supra note 146. 
 191 See HELLENIC PARLIAMENT, THE CONSTITUTION OF GREECE, AS REVISED BY 
THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION OF MAY 27TH 2008 OF THE VIIITH REVISIONARY 
PARLIAMENT 7, 17 (Kostas Mavrias et al. eds., Xenophon Paparrigopoulos et al., trans., 
2008), available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-
9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf (stating that in 1974, “Greece came out of 
[a] seven year long dictatorship” and entrusted the Fifth Revisionary Parliament “with 
the task to shape the modern features of the democratic regime [in the new 
Constitution],” which subsequently chose “as form of the democratic government that 
of a republic” and thereafter describing the current form of government as a 
“parliamentary republic” where “[a]ll powers derive from the People and exist for the 
People and the Nation”); see also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 144, at 704. 
 192 See infra Part II. Regarding the “absence of benefit” prong generally, it 
should be noted that this examination considers Greece’s debt situation as a whole, 
with particular emphasis on the arguments promoted by the creators of Debtocracy and 
other proponents of Greece’s debt cancellation. A closer analysis might reveal some 
miscellaneous expenditures of which the population did not feel any benefit. But such 
an investigation would entail the intricate and complex task of tracking every 
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The years 2000–2009 reflected a time of particularly substantial 
borrowing for Greece, during which Greece experienced “a 
decade-long consumer and public sector spending boom.”193 
Because the government spent the proceeds of these loans 
directly on the people, including via social welfare and public 
sector wages,194 the population indeed felt the benefits of these 
loans. Thus, a strict reading of “benefit”—as promoted by Sack, 
Ben-Shahar, Gulati, and other theorists—would reject a claim 
that Greece’s debts are odious. 
The spending on the 2004 Athens Olympics merits 
individual analysis under the narrow “absence of benefit” 
interpretation. Debtocracy and other proponents of Greece 
invoking the odious debt doctrine argue that the government’s 
elaborate spending for 2004 Olympics reflects an odious use of 
loan proceeds without benefit to the people. But a significant 
portion of the 2004 Olympics expenses went toward city 
infrastructure development, including a new metro system, a 
new airport, a tram, a light railway network, and a bypass 
highway.195 These costs, as well as the expenses of the security 
systems, undoubtedly conferred benefits upon the Greek people 
more than anyone else. Other Olympics expenses, including the 
construction of buildings and arenas, served a greater purpose 
of improving the economy through tourism, one of Greece’s 
primary industries196—which would create enough of a benefit 
to qualify under the narrow interpretation of the doctrine.197 In 
any case, the excesses spent on the Olympics clearly do not 
resemble the narrowly-defined examples of “personal 
enrichment” or “oppressive institutions” intended by Sack and 
  
transaction by the Greek government over a large span of years—which information 
this examination is unable to procure. As such, this note will instead choose to focus on 
the aforementioned arguments advanced by Debtocracy. 
 193 See MANOLOPOULOS, supra note 10, at 21. 
 194 See Wallop, supra note 51. 
 195 See Derek Gatopoulos, Greek Financial Crisis: Did 2004 Athens Olympics Spark 
Problems In Greece?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/06/03/greek-financial-crisis-olympics_n_598829.html.  
 196 Of the seven industries listed on the Greece webpage of the reference site 
World Factbook, “tourism” is listed first and reportedly accounts for 15% of the nation’s 
GDP. See CIA, supra note 56. Also, according to a 2010 report by the United Nations 
World Tourism Organization, Greece hosted 14.9 million international tourists in 2009, 
and is ranked as the seventh most visited country in the EU and sixteenth in the world. 
See U.N. WORLD TOURISM ORG., WORLD TOURISM BAROMETER, Vol. 8, no. 2 (June 2010), 
available at http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom10_2_en.pdf. 
 197 If a greater purpose of aiding tourism were not sufficient to justify any 
elaborate expenses for Olympic events, then practically every host of the Olympic 
games could routinely cancel their debts related to the games after the fact. 
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other theorists.198 Altogether, Greece’s situation would not 
qualify under the narrow definition of “absence of benefit.” 
On the other hand, Greece would likely prevail under a 
liberal interpretation of “absence of benefit.” Given that the 
government’s lavish spending ultimately proved disastrous to 
the people,199 this long-term detriment, despite the initially-felt 
benefit, would qualify under a liberal interpretation of “absence 
of benefit” element. 
Furthermore, under the liberal approach, satisfying the 
“absence of benefit” prong means that the “absence of consent” 
element is also likely fulfilled. As discussed a few paragraphs 
earlier, the liberal interpretation of the doctrine would find the 
“absence of consent” prong satisfied upon an adequate showing 
under the “absence of benefit” prong. 
Altogether, because of the nature of Greece’s debt, 
Greece requires either the liberal “odious regime” standard or 
the liberal “odious debt” standard in order to successfully 
invoke the odious debt doctrine. This analysis also shows that a 
narrow interpretation of the “odious debt” standard would 
exclude Greece from its protection. Therefore, since this note 
favors the application of the narrow interpretation exclusively, 
Greece should not use the odious debt doctrine to repudiate its 
debt. 
B. Alternatives to the Odious Debt Doctrine 
While this note argues that Greece should not be 
permitted to invoke the odious debt doctrine, countries that are 
“weighed down by a history of imprudent borrowings [are] not, 
however, wholly without recourse.”200 Thus, this Part will advance 
three alternatives to invoking the odious debt doctrine.201  
One option, and perhaps the most obvious one, is simple 
debt repayment. Of course, this seemingly perfunctory 
suggestion may be impossible in some situations, but it 
remains nonetheless a possible solution for countries whose 
debt, though onerous, is not odious. Currently, the Greek 
government has manifested its intent to repay its debt,202 
  
 198 See Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 45. 
 199 See supra Part II. 
 200 Buchheit et al., supra note 14. at 1261. 
 201 Perhaps not all of these options are possible for Greece or in Greece’s best 
interests, but a separate, more extensive study would be warranted to make that 
determination.  
 202 See Allen et al., supra note 8. 
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although it has required the cooperation of its creditors in 
terms of time extensions203 and rescue packages.204  
A restructuring of the debt is a second viable solution 
for resolving debt repayment problems.205 As one commentator 
points out, “[s]ince a sovereign’s creditors cannot liquidate or 
seize assets to satisfy the debt,” as discussed previously in this 
note,206 “[the creditors] must wait until the sovereign has 
sufficient assets to satisfy its obligations,” which would entail 
restructuring its payment of principal and interest.207 This 
method also has its pitfalls, predominantly creditor holdouts, 
moral hazard, and lack of coordination, which may impede an 
effective restructuring.208 On the other hand, because 
restructuring involves independent and private transactions—
as opposed to international dispute resolutions—it does not set 
any precedent and avoids the risks associated with that effect. 
A third alternative would be to declare bankruptcy 
without invoking the odious debt doctrine. Although this recourse 
avoids the dangerous precedent-setting risks of the odious debt 
doctrine, it also involves numerous other complexities and policy 
concerns. For example, in Greece’s case, one author rejects the 
idea of a beneficial default, finding that  
[Greece] would then no longer pay debt interest, but it would have to 
close its primary fiscal deficit (the deficit before interest payments), 
of 9-10 [percent] of GDP, at once. This would be a far more brutal 
tightening than Greece has now agreed. Moreover, with default, the 
banking system would collapse.209  
  
 203 See Reuters, Greece Says Still Seeking More Time to Pay Off Debt, FOX 
BUS. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/10/04/greece-says-still-
seeking-more-time-to-pay-off-debt/#ixzz2PUz3ff88 (reporting that “[t]he Greek 
government has asked for more time to implement painful reforms” and “allow euro 
zone rescue funds to be used to recapitalize its banks” before repaying its debt). 
 204 See Abdul Ahad, EU-IMF Audit to Resume in Greece, BUS. RECORDER (Apr 
3, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.brecorder.com/world/global-business-a-economy/113590-
eu-imf-audit-to-resume-in-greece.html (reporting that Greece’s “bailout, initiated in 
2010, is over 20 times higher” than a “10-billion-euro ($12.8-billion) bailout” that the 
EU, the IMF, and the European Central Bank discussed giving Cyprus in 2013). 
 205 See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1261-62 (finding that “[t]he sovereign 
debt restructuring process as it has evolved over the last twenty-five years is often not 
pleasant—indeed, it is frequently exasperating, contentious, and attenuated—but it is 
a recognized feature of the international financial system”). 
 206 See supra Part I.A. 
 207 Brenneman, supra note 27, at 662. 
 208 For a more extensive examination of these pitfalls of restructuring, see id., 
at 662-70. 
 209 Martin Wolf, A Bail-Out for Greece Is Just the Beginning, FIN. TIMES 
(May 4, 2010, 8:13 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de21becc-57af-11df-855b-
00144feab49a.html#ixzz1qNw4Y2N7. 
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On the other hand, an investigation by Borensztein and 
Panizza showed that the economic effects of a default are 
actually short-lived, limited to at most a few years,210 which 
would suggest that the economic costs of default for Greece 
may not be as severe as commonly thought.211 
These three options reflect just three of many possible 
viable alternatives to the odious debt doctrine as solutions for 
Greece’s situation. The years to come likely will prove which of 
any possible solutions will serve Greece the best. 
CONCLUSION 
This note has set out to analyze the odious debt doctrine 
within the context of Greece’s financial debt crisis and 
ultimately arrived at three primary findings: (1) at a universal 
level, the odious debt doctrine should not be applied because of 
its critical inherent doctrinal and administrative failings; (2) 
even if the odious debt doctrine were applied, it should be 
interpreted narrowly, since a liberal interpretation of the 
doctrine involves increased policy risks; and (3) under a narrow 
interpretation of the odious debt doctrine, Greece would not be 
eligible to cancel its debt. Therefore, Greece should not be 
permitted to invoke the protection of the odious debt doctrine and 
should instead resort to other solutions to resolve its debt crisis.  
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 210 For example, this study found that while default episodes are associated 
with credit damage and a drop in bilateral trade, both of these events tend to be short 
lived, spanning only a few years. Similarly, while default episodes are also associated 
with a decrease in output growth in the following year, no significant growth effect is 
noted in years subsequent. See Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of 
Sovereign Default (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 081238, 2008). 
 211 Although, as an author from Forbes points out, Borensztein and Panizza’s 
study only used examples in which “economic recovery was helped by exchange-rate 
depreciation,” which “does not seem to be an option for countries that belong to the 
Eurozone.” “VoxEU,” What Will Happen if Greece Defaults? Insights from Theory and 
Reality, FORBES (May 7, 2010 4:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davos/2010/05/ 
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